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- The Quine–Putnam indispensability argument[a] is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics for the existence of abstract mathematical objects such as numbers and sets, a position known as mathematical platonism.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine–Putnam_indispensability_argument
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Dec 21, 1998 · In particular, Quine (1976; 1980a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981c) and Putnam (1979a; 1979b) have argued that the indispensability of mathematics to empirical science gives us good reason to believe in the existence of mathematical entities.
Hilary Putnam. The Quine–Putnam indispensability argument[a] is an argument in the philosophy of mathematics for the existence of abstract mathematical objects such as numbers and sets, a position known as mathematical platonism. It was named after the philosophers Willard Quine and Hilary Putnam, and is one of the most important arguments in ...
Apr 9, 2010 · Quine does not accept the existence of any abstract objects apart from sets. His ontology thus excludes other alleged abstracta, such as properties, propositions (as distinct from sentences), and merely possible entities.
- Peter Hylton, Gary Kemp
- 2010
Sep 28, 2007 · Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of abstract mathematical objects at all.
- David Liggins
- david.liggins@manchester.ac.uk
- 2007
Apr 9, 2010 · Quine’s life and work. 1908: born, Akron, Ohio, on June 25 th. 1926–30: attended Oberlin College, Ohio; B.A, major in Mathematics with honors reading in mathematical philosophy. 1930–32: attended Harvard University; Ph.D. in Philosophy, dissertation on Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica.
This article focuses on Quine's positive views and their bearing on the philosophy of mathematics. It begins with his views concerning the relationship between scientific theories and experiential evidence (his holism), and relate these to his views on the evidence for the existence of objects (his criterion of ontological commitment, his ...
According to Quine, the reasons for accepting the existence of molecules, atoms, and quarks are analogous to the reasons for accepting the common sense belief that there are physical objects, namely that the best theories of our experience postulate such entities.
