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Is reason a slave of passions?
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Reason is the slave of the passions in the sense that practical reason alone cannot give rise to moral motivation; it is altogether dependent on pre-existing desires that furnish motivational force. For Hume, this is not a fact we should lament (as moralists do) but a basic fact about our psychology. Share.
“Reason Is and Ought Only to Be the Slave of the Passions” One of the most notorious of Hume’s views about the passions concerns their relation to our practical reason. Hume locates our motivations in the passions.
Nov 17, 2021 · This common picture of human action is denied by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776). Hume instead claims that acting rationally means going along with our desires. That is a central idea expressed by his famous quote: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.”
Oct 29, 2004 · Hume’s position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4).
Jan 20, 2024 · In his quote, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them," David Hume challenges the conventional hierarchy between reason and passion.
Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations.
Apr 1, 2008 · There are two points that Hume attempts to prove in defending the claim that reason is the slave of the passions: "That reason alone can never be the motive to any action of the will, and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will" (T 2.3.3.1; SBN 413).