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Oct 29, 2004 · Hume famously sets himself in opposition to most moral philosophers, ancient and modern, who talk of the combat of passion and reason, and who urge human beings to regulate their actions by reason and to grant it dominion over their contrary passions.
- Property and Ownership
The story assumes that individuals are able to reason...
- Property and Ownership
We cannot be criticized rationally for our desires (As Hume remarks, it is "not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger" (p 416)). Reason is the slave of the passions in the sense that practical reason alone cannot give rise to moral motivation; it is altogether dependent on pre-existing ...
This chapter examines Hume's account of the passions and moral judgement. It attempts to place in perspective two of Hume's most celebrated themes: that reason is the slave of the passions, and that moral distinctions are not derived from reason.
Nov 17, 2021 · Passion is in charge, and reason merely serves passion. “Reason,” he says, is “the slave of the passions.” You might think Hume must be wrong, because we act against our passions all the time.
11 - Hume on Reason and Passion. Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015. By. Nicholas L. Sturgeon. Edited by. Donald C. Ainslie and. Annemarie Butler. Chapter. Get access. Cite. Summary. A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided.
- Nicholas L. Sturgeon
- 2015
Jul 1, 2014 · Hume said that reason alone cannot motivate and that passions are required to produce volitions and actions. It is argued that the widely, though not universally, held “Humean” view of motivation—that beliefs require desires to motivate actions—does not accurately reflect Hume’s own view.
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Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition.
