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- Passion, that intense and compelling enthusiasm or desire for something, is a driving force that can propel individuals to extraordinary heights. It is the spark that ignites innovation, the fuel that sustains perseverance, and the energy that powers resilience.
medium.com/@drthediasamara/the-psychology-of-passion-what-drives-us-9cf11d66b3f0The Psychology of Passion: What Drives Us? | by Dr. Thedia ...
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Oct 29, 2004 · Intentional actions are caused by the direct passions (including the instincts). Of the indirect passions Hume says that pride, humility, love and hatred do not directly cause action; it is not clear whether he thinks this true of all the indirect passions.
- Property and Ownership
When someone says ‘X is mine’ and X is an action, we see...
- Property and Ownership
Dec 8, 2016 · Abstract. Hume famously argued that reason is the slave of the passions, and sets no ends, moral or otherwise, by itself; Kant argues that moral action must be determined by reason alone. Their positions seem diametrically opposed.
- Background. [I]t seems to me certain that a great light in the intellect is followed by a great inclination in the will; so that if we see very clearly that a thing is good for us, it is very difficult—and on my view, impossible, as long as one continues in the same thought—to stop the course of our desire.
- An Example. Although this paper is primarily about reason, belief, the passions, and motivation, I want to further illustrate the importance of the doctrine of impressions and ideas on these topics with a point about the beginning of Book 3 and the moral sentiments.
- Belief. In the passage from T 3.1.1.9 just quoted, Hume spoke of “passions, volitions, and actions.” This is a useful grouping because often in Hume it is irrelevant whether one talks of a passion, which causes a volition and hence an action, or a volition, which causes an action, or, simply, of an action.
- Motivation. The claim that beliefs—typically beliefs about pleasure—can cause PVAs is enough to show that Hume is not a “Humean” about motivation and action.
This chapter examines Hume's account of the passions and moral judgement. It attempts to place in perspective two of Hume's most celebrated themes: that reason is the slave of the passions, and that moral distinctions are not derived from reason.
Reason and judgment may, indeed, be the mediate cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion: But it is not pretended, that a judgment of this kind, either in its truth or falshood, is attended with virtue or vice.
Mar 14, 2012 · Hume's account of the passions is largely neglected because the author's purposes tend to be missed. The passions were accepted by early modern philosophers, of whatever persuasion, as the mental effects of bodily processes.
Because passions are ‘impressions’, they are active psychological causes, sufficient to cause action. Because they are ‘impressions of reflection’, they incorporate the information about our situation that our memory, our beliefs, our reason and our reflection have given us.
