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- According to Kant, freedom is a “kind of causality” (A445/B473).2 It is the capacity to initiate causal chains of itself without prior grounds, independently of nature’s causal laws. Freedom is causality through concepts, determined by reason’s moral law. (A547f/B575f.)
philpapers.org/archive/KANFAA-3.pdf
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Is Freedom a kind of causality?
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Kant’s view that freedom is a “kind of causality” seems to conflict with his claim that the categories of the understanding – including causality – can only be applied objectively to sensible phaenomena, never to supersensible noumena, as freedom is only possible for the latter.
- Toni Kannisto
In the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the Third Antinomy, Kant offers arguments for a solution to the problem of freedom and necessity which seem to do justice to the claims of libertarianism and determinism. My restricted aim in this short book is to decide whether any of them is sound.
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causality is primarily influenced by rationalist doctrines in the tradition of Leibniz, and only secondarily influenced by empiricist doctrines in the tradition of Hume.
According to Kant, freedom is a “kind of causality” (A445/B473).2 It is the capacity to initiate causal chains of itself without prior grounds, independently of nature’s causal laws.
the concept of freedom plays an important role in the organization of people’s lives. People strongly desire freedom, and therefore support governments, programs, policies, and candidates that they perceive to advance its cause. But what people perceive to advance the cause of free-dom depends upon what they understand freedom to be. And thus ...
Jan 19, 2017 · Freedom as a condition for moral responsibility, in Kant’s framework, has two functions: First, freedom secures the idea of authorship by designating the person’s will as the first cause of the action.
Dec 14, 2007 · According to the classical compatibilist strategy, not only is freedom compatible with causal determinism, the absence of causation and necessity would make free and responsible action impossible. A free action is an action caused by the agent, whereas an unfree action is caused by some other, external cause.
