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1. link.springer.com › article › 10Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content | Philosophical ...

   link.springer.com › article › 10

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   Dec 1, 2011 · So rather than posing a problem, the postulation of a self-world-distinction mechanism is quite compatible with the notion of the self as an ‘unarticulated constituent’ because it can explain the subpersonal mechanism in virtue of which perception and bodily experience are self-related.

   • Author: Kristina Musholt
   • Email: K.Musholt@lse.ac.uk

   • Publish Year: 2013

2. plato.stanford.edu › entries › self-consciousnessSelf-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › self-consciousness

   Jul 13, 2017 · Accounts of self-consciousness as involving unarticulated constituents, or as implicit in the mode of consciousness, will need to explain how the transition is made from such implicit self-awareness to the explicit representation of the self in first-person thought.

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4. research.manchester.ac.uk › files › 280559385Essays on Self-Awareness and Self-Perception

   research.manchester.ac.uk › files › 280559385

   While the notion of an unarticulated constituent is well established in philosophy of language and linguistics, I show that the notion is unconvincing at the level of perception. The last two papers take up the idea that pre-reflective self-consciousness involves non-conceptual self-representation in experience.

5. www.researchgate.net › publication › 257636998_SelfSelf-consciousness and nonconceptual content - ResearchGate

   www.researchgate.net › publication › 257636998_Self

   Apr 1, 2013 · Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think ‘I’-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of...

   • Author: Kristina Musholt

6. plato.stanford.edu › entries › kant-mindKant’s View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › kant-mind

   Jul 26, 2004 · In this article, we will focus on Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) work on the mind and consciousness of self and related issues. Some commentators believe that Kant’s views on the mind are dependent on his idealism (he called it transcendental idealism). For the most part, that is not so.

   • Author: Andrew Brook, Julian Wuerth

   • Publish Year: 2004

7. plato.stanford.edu › entries › self-consciousnessPhenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › self-consciousness

   Feb 19, 2005 · Another line of attack has focused on what might be called the universality question. Is it truly the case that all conscious mental states involve prereflective self-consciousness, for-me-ness, or what is sometimes referred to as a sense of mineness or sense of ownership?

8. People also ask

   Does self-consciousness involve unarticulated constituents?

   • Accounts of self-consciousness as involving unarticulated constituents, or as implicit in the mode of consciousness, will need to explain how the transition is made from such implicit self-awareness to the explicit representation of the self in first-person thought.

   Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness/index.html

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   Is self-consciousness a form of consciousness?

   • After all, self-consciousness is presumably a form of consciousness (see entry on consciousness). On the view that experience, like thought, has representational content, this can be understood as the view that experiences, like thoughts, can have content that is first-personal.

   Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness/index.html

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   What is a self-conscious subject?

   • Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves as themselves; it is manifest to them that they themselves are the object of awareness. Self-consciousness is a form of consciousness that is paradigmatically expressed in English by the words “I”, “me”, and “my”, terms that each of us uses to refer to ourselves as such.

   Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness/index.html

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   Does Consciousness entail intransitive self-consciousness?

   • If conscious states are those that represent themselves then, it might be argued, consciousness entails intransitive self-consciousness, since one’s conscious states do not only represent themselves but also (in some way implicitly) represent oneself as having them (Kriegel 2003: 104).

   Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness/index.html

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   Can consciousness be reduced to self-consciousness?

   • If consciousness cannot be reduced to self-consciousness, perhaps the latter is nevertheless a necessary condition of the former. Some non-reductive views, already mentioned, see pre-reflective consciousness (see §3.2), or the sense of ownership (see §3.3) as necessary conditions of consciousness (see Zahavi 2005).

   Self-Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness/index.html

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   What if consciousness of self ascribes nothing to the self?

   • If consciousness of self ascribes nothing to the self, it can be a “bare … consciousness of self [as one is]” and yet yield no knowledge of self—it is “very far from being a knowledge of the self” (B158).

   Kant’s View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-mind/

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9. academic.oup.com › book › 56757 The Composition of Consciousness | The Self: Naturalism ...

   academic.oup.com › book › 5675

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   Abstract. There are two ways to account for the nature of phenomenologically presented ownership constitutive of the “immersed” self. One sees it as fundamentally a relationship of bodily ownership: the theory of a core self as bodily feeling of presence to oneself is a bodily account of immersion. Other accounts develop an analysis out of ...