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- Background. [I]t seems to me certain that a great light in the intellect is followed by a great inclination in the will; so that if we see very clearly that a thing is good for us, it is very difficult—and on my view, impossible, as long as one continues in the same thought—to stop the course of our desire.
- An Example. Although this paper is primarily about reason, belief, the passions, and motivation, I want to further illustrate the importance of the doctrine of impressions and ideas on these topics with a point about the beginning of Book 3 and the moral sentiments.
- Belief. In the passage from T 3.1.1.9 just quoted, Hume spoke of “passions, volitions, and actions.” This is a useful grouping because often in Hume it is irrelevant whether one talks of a passion, which causes a volition and hence an action, or a volition, which causes an action, or, simply, of an action.
- Motivation. The claim that beliefs—typically beliefs about pleasure—can cause PVAs is enough to show that Hume is not a “Humean” about motivation and action.
Oct 29, 2004 · Hume’s position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4).
Jan 1, 2015 · In the Treatise, Hume often refers to reason and passion distinctly, as though reason and passion are dichotomous. In a few key passages, however, he implicitly dissolves the distinction.
This chapter examines Hume's account of the passions and moral judgement. It attempts to place in perspective two of Hume's most celebrated themes: that reason is the slave of the passions, and that moral distinctions are not derived from reason.
Dec 8, 2016 · Hume famously argued that reason is the slave of the passions, and sets no ends, moral or otherwise, by itself; Kant argues that moral action must be determined by reason alone. Their positions seem diametrically opposed. But Hume recognized that we have a calm passion for tranquility, which mimics reason, and is a foundation of morality, while ...
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015. By. Nicholas L. Sturgeon. Edited by. Donald C. Ainslie and. Annemarie Butler. Chapter. Hume’s Early Biography andA Treatise of Human Nature. The Ideas of Space and Time and Spatial and Temporal Ideas inTreatise1.2.
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Fulke Greville speaks of the will as inevitably divided between reason and passion. Shakespeare takes such a division seriously but, through Hamlet, he recognizes the possibility of reason and passion being united in a man's will and purpose.
