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1. www.jstor.org › stable › 40232175Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views ...

   www.jstor.org › stable › 40232175

   Consciousness, in the sense of intransitive self-consciousness, is defini- tionally linked to self-awareness, because having a mental state self-con- sciously implies being aware of it.

2. www.cambridge.org › core › journalsConsciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views ...

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   Jan 1, 2020 · To avoid the ambiguities of the word ‘consciousness,’ I will introduce a term of art: intransitive self-consciousness. As the term suggests, the phenomenon I have in mind is a kind of self-consciousness, or self-awareness.

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     What is consciousness? Philosopher, Dan Dennett explains.

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4. plato.stanford.edu › entries › self-consciousnessPhenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › self-consciousness

   Feb 19, 2005 · For phenomenologists, the immediate and first-personal givenness of experience is accounted for in terms of a prereflective self-consciousness.

   • Author: Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi

   • Publish Year: 2005

5. www.nature.com › articles › s41599/020/00591-yTwo conceptions of consciousness and why only the neo ...

   www.nature.com › articles › s41599/020/00591-y

   Sep 15, 2020 · We discuss briefly four examples: intransitive consciousness, perceptual consciousness, somatic consciousness and self-consciousness. (1) Intransitive consciousness, we have seen, is ...

   • Author: Harry Smit, Peter Hacker

   • Publish Year: 2020

6. www.jstor.org › stable › 27903865Consciousness and Self-Consciousness - JSTOR

   www.jstor.org › stable › 27903865

   when it comes to intransitive self-consciousness, it appears that no conscious ness can occur in its absence. In that sense, consciousness is dependent upon intransitive self-consciousness. 1. Transitive and Intransitive Consciousness The term 'consciousness' is multiply ambiguous. In one sense it denotes a faculty, in another a property.

7. www.tandfonline.com › doi › absConsciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views ...

   www.tandfonline.com › doi › abs

   Jul 1, 2013 · Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Source: Informa UK Limited.

8. People also ask

   Does consciousness involve self-consciousness?

   • A related view has been defended by Owen Flanagan, who not only argues that consciousness involves self-consciousness in the weak sense that there is something it is like for the subject to have the experience, but also speaks of the low-level self-consciousness involved in experiencing my experiences as mine (Flanagan 1992, 194).

   Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/

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   Can consciousness be explained?

   • One's view of the prospects for explaining consciousness will typically depend upon one's perspective. Optimistic physicalists will likely see current explanatory lapses as merely the reflection of the early stage of inquiry and sure to be remedied in the not too distant future (Dennett 1991, Searle 1992, P. M.Churchland 1995).

   Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

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   Can consciousness be explained in functional terms?

   • Critics of functionalism often deny that consciousness can be adequately explicated in functional terms (Block 1980a, 1980b, Levine 1983, Chalmers 1996). According to such critics, consciousness may have interesting functional characteristics but its nature is not essentially functional.

   Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

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   Does Consciousness have integrated information?

   • However, a proposal by the neuroscientist Giulio Tononi (2008) goes further in identifying consciousness with integrated information and asserting that information integration of the relevant sort is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness regardless of the substrate in which it is realized (which need not be neural or biological).

   Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

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   How does one explain a feature in relation to one kind of consciousness?

   • How one explains a given feature in relation to one sort of consciousness may not correspond with what is needed to explain it relative to another. Explanans. The range of possible explanans is also diverse.

   Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

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   When does consciousness occur in both the access and phenomenal sense?

   • Of special importance is the claim that consciousness in both the access and phenomenal sense occurs when and only when the relevant content enters the larger global network involving both primary sensory areas as well as many other areas including frontal and parietal areas associated with attention.

   Consciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/

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9. plato.stanford.edu › entries › consciousnessConsciousness - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › consciousness

   Jun 18, 2004 · Consciousness may not require a distinct or substantial self of the traditional Cartesian sort, but at least some degree of perspectivally self-like organization seems essential for the existence of anything that might count as conscious experience.