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The Nature of Mental States Hilary Putnam The typical concerns of the Philosopher of Mind might be represented by three questions: (1) How do we know that other people have pains? (2) Are pains brain states? (3) What is the analysis of the concept pain? I do not wish to discuss questions (1) and (3) in this chapter.
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Summary. The typical concerns of the Philosopher of Mind might be represented by three questions: (1) How do we know that other people have pains? (2) Are pains brain states? (3) What is the analysis of the concept pain?
Jan 12, 2013 · The Brain-State theorist makes a very strong and implausible claim: any organism is in pain if and only if (1) it possesses a brain of a suitable physical-chemical structure, and (2) its brain is in that physical-chemical state.
Jul 8, 2016 · This article examines the post-Ryle developments in philosophy of mind and psychology, in particular tracing the emergence of the concept of a mental state. The climate immediately following the large-scale rejection of Descartes seems rather hostile to the idea of mental properties as internal states that cause behaviour.
- Richard Floyd
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Jun 5, 2012 · Summary. In the previous chapter, we focused on two important metaphysical questions in the philosophy of mind. One was the question of whether persons or subjects of experience are identical with their physical bodies, or certain parts of those bodies, such as their brains.
The Nature of Mental States. In N. Block (Ed.), Volume I Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I (pp. 223-231). Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.
Jul 7, 2015 · This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that ‘the brain represents the world’ might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions.
