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- (Conclusion) The rules of morality are not founded on reason alone. He repeats the argument in EPM, in slightly different terms: The end of all moral speculations is to teach us our duty; and, by proper representations of the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, beget correspondent habits, and engage us to avoid the one, and embrace the other.
academic.oup.com/book/11302/chapter/159877499Morality and Motivation | Hume, Passion, and Action | Oxford ...
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Book 3, Part 3 Summary. In this final part, Hume discusses “natural virtues,” meaning those virtues that come directly out of human nature. Hume sees sympathy as the best explanation for how these virtues operate in human psychology.
- A Treatise of Human Nature Summary and Study Guide | SuperSummary
Divided into three books, A Treatise of Human Nature...
- A Treatise of Human Nature Summary and Study Guide | SuperSummary
A summary of A Treatise of Human Nature: Book III: “Of Morals” in David Hume's Selected Works of David Hume. Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of Selected Works of David Hume and what it means. Perfect for acing essays, tests, and quizzes, as well as for writing lesson plans.
The conclusion of Book 3, and therefore the Treatise as a whole, briefly recapitulates the reasoning for Hume's thesis that "sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions". Indeed, most would agree that justice and "the useful qualities of the mind" are valued for their usefulness, and what besides sympathy can explain why we care about ...
Divided into three books, A Treatise of Human Nature explores Hume’s initial ideas about the processes of human understanding, the nature of emotions and passions, and the structures of human morality.
It was argued in 3.2.1 that only the quality or character lying behind the action is durable enough to produce the requisite indirect passion; single actions cannot do so.
Treatise III David Hume i: Virtue and vice in general Actions can be praiseworthy or blameworthy, but they can’t be reasonable or unreasonable; so ‘praiseworthy’ and ‘blame-worthy’ are not the same as ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’. The merit and demerit of actions frequently contradict and
It has been shown in Book II, Part III, Section 3 that reason alone can have no influence on our actions. Since morals do influence our actions and reason alone does not, the author concludes that morals cannot be derived from reason, which “of itself is utterly impotent” to excite passions or influence any actions.
