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- According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object.
www.jstor.org/stable/26370780Intentionality and Reference: A Brentanian Distinction - JSTOR
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May 28, 2006 · Among Brentano's most important and philosophically influential achievements is his thesis of the intentionality of mind. To say that thought is intentional is to say that it intends or is about something, that it aims at or is directed upon an intended object.
- Dale Jacquette
- 2004
Aug 20, 2021 · In demarcating the meaning of the term, Brentano adopts a very specific position: consciousness is intentional in terms of its directedness (Richtung) towards something outside the mind; intentionality is thus the root of consciousness, and conversely the root of intentionality is the conscious experience of the subject. Consciousness and ...
- Mauro Antonelli
- mauro.antonelli@unimib.it
- 2021
Dec 4, 2002 · Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1917) is mainly known for his work in philosophy of psychology, especially for having introduced the notion of intentionality to contemporary philosophy.
May 21, 2023 · In his lectures on descriptive psychology, one learns that his psychology concerns the ‘analysis’ of the ‘content’ of concepts. This analysis, in turn, is made possible by a previous ‘analytic description of phenomena,’ by which Brentano means mental acts and states and their intentional correlates.
Aug 7, 2003 · As one reads these lines, numerous questions arise: what does Brentano mean when he says that the object towards which the mind directs itself ‘is not to be understood as meaning a thing’? What can it be for a phenomenon (mental or otherwise) to exhibit ‘the intentional inexistence of an object’?
Brentano says that an ‘immanent’ object is not ‘something real’ (eine Realit€at). He develops this claim in a number of later works, notably in his lectures on psychology from the period 1880–1890 (Brentano 1982). In these lectures, Brentano affirms that an ‘immanent object’ is ‘unreal’.
May 28, 2006 · The topic of “intentionality” is a well-known quagmire. There seems to be no doubt that the Scholastic intentio had fallen into disuse in modern philosophy until it was recovered by Franz Brentano in an arresting way in the original edition (1874) of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint .
