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What is intentional inexistence According to Brentano?
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Is intentionality a mark of mentality?
Aug 7, 2003 · In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual’s mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents.
- Consciousness and Intentionality
This “directedness” conception of intentionality plays a...
- Attention
This is particularly clear in Dugald Stewart’s 1792 Elements...
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
To say, in this sense, that someone sees green in just to...
- Folk Psychology as a Theory
For this reason, a great deal of work in analytic philosophy...
- Teleological Theories of Mental Content
In the terminology re-introduced into philosophy by Franz...
- Brentano, Franz
Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1917) is mainly known for his...
- Consciousness and Intentionality
Dec 4, 2002 · Franz Clemens Brentano (1838–1917) is mainly known for his work in philosophy of psychology, especially for having introduced the notion of intentionality to contemporary philosophy.
May 28, 2006 · Among Brentano's most important and philosophically influential achievements is his thesis of the intentionality of mind. To say that thought is intentional is to say that it intends or is about something, that it aims at or is directed upon an intended object.
- Dale Jacquette
- 2004
Jun 22, 2002 · This “directedness” conception of intentionality plays a prominent role in the philosophy of Franz Brentano and those whose views developed, directly or indirectly, in response to his (to be discussed in Section 3).
The notion of intentionality is what Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround both the phenomenon he had in mind and the account of it he proposed, that is, both his explanandum and his explanation. In this chapter, I argue for two main claims.
Intentionality is not the only relation to an object that Brentano admitted in his phil-osophy. Importantly, Brentano can be found to say that when the object of a mental act exists in reality, a relation of similarity, in addition to intentionality, holds be-tween the act and the object.
The major role played by intentionality in affairs of the mind led Brentano (1884) to regard intentionality as “the mark of the mental”; a necessary and sufficient condition for mentality. But some non-mental phenomena seem to display intentionality too—pictures, signposts, and words, for example.
