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- There is a broad consensus in the literature that in the section on ‘The Genus’ in the Science of Logic, Hegel argues that any living being must exist among other instances of its kind, with which it reproduces to create future generations, and out of which it was itself produced.
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin/article/on-origins-and-species-hegel-on-the-genusprocess/6601341EE1537DB8B95E8CCE77955A92/share/928992ceb226f4d4e6f5c3f66697d6d76c1b246a
Any living organism, no matter its size or complexity, needs to demolish and rebuild its constitutive materials through its metabolic activities: assimilation,
Mar 18, 2021 · On my reading, in his logic Hegel purports to develop the concept of the logical living individual at a highly abstract level, without relying on any facts about biological life, or indeed on the knowledge of any other empirical phenomena. I present my reconstruction of his chapter on life in the Science of Logic in Section 2.
Apr 29, 2022 · In this paper, I explore Hegel’s contention that “organisation” is a basic feature of living beings. Reconstructing and illuminating this key insight will allow me to show how and why “organisation” is the central notion shaping Hegel’s views on organism and the natural normativity they manifest.
Jun 6, 2017 · Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature is best understood through its contribution to Hegel’s larger philosophical project of both articulating and actually achieving human freedom. It contributes to this project by showing that nature and natural things are themselves free, in a specific sense of freedom that Hegel critically appropriates from Kant.
Sep 19, 2023 · For Hegel, nature is a theatre of adaptation, but as an interactive process, where the organism not only adapts itself to but also actively modifies the environment, e.g., plants adapting the soil to their needs.
Mar 1, 2012 · Here Hegel’s principal concern is to develop the type of purposiveness which comes into play in Kant’s notion of the living organism; a purposiveness with a meaning other than that of the mental and external teleology mentioned earlier.
In the case of life, Hegel names the realization of one of the mismatches driving the Idea's self-transformation ‘death’, and it is to the role of death—or its absence—in Ng's account of that transformation to which I now turn for my last set of comments. III. Cognition and Death.
