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  1. Byrnes never openly threatened the Soviets with the atomic bomb. But his feelings about covert atomic diplomacy were noticed shortly after the war by Sec. of War Henry Stimson, Assistant Sec. of War John McCloy, and Manhattan Project scientific director J. Robert Oppenheimer, all of whom were worried that even an implied nuclear threat could ...

    • Who's Who

      Below are some of the people who were involved in the atomic...

  2. Jun 5, 2012 · Summary. A proper accounting of the development of American policy to defeat Japan and bring World War II to an end must take due note of the crucial role played by James F. Byrnes. Although he is not well-remembered today, the experienced South Carolinian possessed tremendous gifts for politics.

  3. James Byrnes, President Truman’s Secretary of State, is examined by author Paul Ham for his role in securing the 'unconditional surrender' of Japan in WWII.

  4. President Truman and his Secretary of State James Byrnes missed a historic opportunity by not attempting to end the war through compromise and a clear warning to Japan about the atom bomb in the Potsdam Declaration, followed by a demonstration of the bomb’s power in a non-lethal setting.

  5. Jun 19, 2014 · Byrnes position was essentially: "if we insisted on unconditional surrender, we could justify dropping of the atomic bomb." Concerned about the post-war political consequences of Soviet participation in the war, U.S. planners sought to bring about Japan's surrender before the Soviets could join. At best, Soviet participation in the war was an ...

  6. Byrnes tried to use the bomb as an implied threat in their negotiations with the Russians. When Stalin and Molotov refused to give in to this pressure, and Truman and Byrnes recognized that the bomb could not be used to assure free elections in Eastern Europe or to force Soviet evacuation of northern

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  8. Headed by Stimson and James Byrnes, whom Truman would soon name secretary of state, the Interim Committee was a group of respected statesmen and scientists closely linked to the war effort. After five meetings between May 9 and June 1, it recommended use of the bomb against Japan as soon as possible and rejected arguments for advance warning.