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Norm (philosophy) Norms are concepts ( sentences) of practical import, oriented to affecting an action, rather than conceptual abstractions that describe, explain, and express. Normative sentences imply "ought-to" (or "may", "may not") types of statements and assertions, in distinction to sentences that provide "is" (or "was", "will") types of ...
Aug 25, 2020 · The internalization hypothesis can then be construed as a claim that internalized norms are intrinsically motivating for the simple reason that it is a fundamental psychological feature of normative psychology that once a norm has been acquired, delivered to, and represented in a person’s norm database, the norm system automatically confers this distinctive motivational profile on the norm.
- Daniel Kelly, Stephen Setman
- 2020
Feb 21, 2008 · According to L1, there are at least four necessary conditions for lying. First, lying requires that a person make a statement (statement condition). Second, lying requires that the person believe the statement to be false; that is, lying requires that the statement be untruthful (untruthfulness condition).
May 9, 2017 · Abstract. This article provides an overview of recent, empirically supported categorization schemes that have been proposed to distinguish different kinds of norms. Amongst these are the moral–conventional distinction and divisions within moral norms such as those proposed by moral foundations theory. I identify several dimensions along which ...
- Elizabeth O'Neill
- 09 May 2017
- 21
- 12, Issue5
May 16, 2011 · Lastly, the norms-as-conventions thesis appears to give us a clear and operationalisable understanding of social norms that can form the basis for systematic social scientific investigation. Though the notion of a social norm may strike us as rather mysterious, the notion of a convention is relatively well understood, ontologically secure, and explanatorily salient.
- Nicholas Southwood, Lina Eriksson
- 2011
James Edwin Mahon is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at The City University of New York– Lehman College. He is the author of the entry The Definition of Lies and Deception for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, as well as a number of articles and book chapters on Kant on lies.
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Abstract. This chapter argues that thinking about deception can teach a great deal about the nature of value and truth, what one can expect from a theory of truth, and why some truth theories are doomed to inadequacy. It opens with an account of the nature of lying and how it should be distinguished from deception.
