Yahoo Web Search

Search results

      • By May 1945, most of the Imperial Japanese Navy had been sunk and the remnants had taken refuge in Japan's harbors. By July 1945, all but one of the IJN's capital ships had been sunk in raids by the United States Navy. By the end of the war, the IJN had lost 334 warships and 300,386 officers and men.
      en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_in_World_War_II
  1. People also ask

  2. List of United States Navy and Coast Guard ships lost during World War II, from 31 October 1941 to 31 December 1946, [1] sorted by type and name. This listing also includes constructive losses, which are ships that were damaged beyond economical repair and disposed of.

  3. Despite the hellish conditions her crew toiled to save their ship, and maintained fire on the enemy ships, sinking the Japanese destroyer Harusame. 28 of her crew were killed in the battle, and another 13 seriously wounded.

  4. Bar Chart: Japanese Naval and Merchant Vessels Sunk by United States Forces divided by groups: submarines, carrier air, land-based air, mines, surface craft and miscellaneous. Source:...

  5. The map is an interactive exhibit of the data in “Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes.”. The map also depicts Japanese sea lines of communication (SLOC) which connected the Japanese empire’s possessions throughout the Pacific as well as key oil production sites (Fig 1).

    • Overview
    • Prelude to war
    • Warnings and responses

    By mid-1941 the United States had severed all economic relations with Japan and was providing material and financial support to China. Japan had been at war with China since 1937, and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 ensured that the Soviets were no longer a threat to the Japanese on the Asian mainland. The Japanese believed that once the U.S. Pacific Fleet was neutralized, all of Southeast Asia would be open for conquest.

    Read more below: Prelude to war

    Japan: The rise of the militarists

    Learn more about the rise of militarism in Japan.

    How long did the Pearl Harbor attack last?

    The first Japanese dive-bomber appeared over Pearl Harbor at 7:55 AM (local time) on December 7, 1941. Over the next half hour, Pearl Harbor’s airfields and docked ships were subjected to a merciless assault with bombs, guns, and torpedoes. A second wave struck at 8:50 AM, and the Japanese withdrew shortly after 9:00 AM. In just over an hour, the Japanese destroyed more than 180 aircraft and destroyed or damaged more than a dozen ships. More than 2,400 U.S. military members and civilians were killed. Learn more in this infographic.

    In the late 1930s, American foreign policy in the Pacific hinged on support for China, and aggression against China by Japan therefore necessarily would bring Japan into conflict with the United States. As early as 1931 the Tokyo government had extended its control over the Chinese province of Manchuria, and the following year the Japanese cemented their hold on the region with the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo. A clash at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing on July 7, 1937, signaled the beginning of open warfare between Japan and the United Front of Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party. In response, the United States government extended its first loan to China in 1938.

    In July 1939 the U.S. announced the termination of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. Beginning in the summer of 1940, the U.S. began to restrict the export to Japan of materials useful in war. Between June 1940 and the fateful crisis of December 1941, the tension constantly mounted. In July 1941, by which time the Japanese had occupied all of Indochina and had entered into an alliance with the Axis powers (Germany and Italy), the U.S. government severed all commercial and financial relations with Japan. Japanese assets were frozen, and an embargo was declared on shipments to Japan of petroleum and other vital war materials. Militarists were steadily gaining in influence in the Tokyo government; they bitterly resented U.S. aid to China, which by this time had been stepped up. They saw in the German invasion of the Soviet Union an unrivaled opportunity to pursue a policy of aggression in the Far East without danger of an attack upon their rear by the forces of the Red Army. Nonetheless, negotiations looking to find some kind of understanding between the United States and Japan took place through the autumn of 1941, and not until near the end of November did it become clear that no agreement was possible.

    Although Japan continued to negotiate with the United States up to the day of the Pearl Harbor attack, the government of Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki decided on war. Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, the commander in chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, had planned the attack against the U.S. Pacific Fleet with great care. Once the U.S. fleet was out of action, the way for the unhindered Japanese conquest of all of Southeast Asia and the Indonesian archipelago would be open. The order for the assault was issued on November 5, 1941, and on November 16 the task force began its rendezvous in the Kuril Islands. Commanders were instructed that the fleet might be recalled, however, in case of a favourable outcome of the negotiations in Washington, D.C. On November 26, Vice Adm. Nagumo Chuichi led a fleet including 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 cruisers, and 11 destroyers to a point some 275 miles (440 km) north of Hawaii. From there about 360 planes in total were launched.

    Britannica Quiz

    The U.S. Pacific Fleet had been stationed at Pearl Harbor since April 1940. In addition to nearly 100 naval vessels, including 8 battleships, there were substantial military and air forces. As the tension mounted, Adm. Husband E. Kimmel and Lieut. Gen. Walter C. Short, who shared command at Pearl Harbor, were warned of the possibility of war, specifically on October 16 and again on November 24 and 27. The notice of November 27, to Kimmel, began, “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning,” went on to say that “negotiations have ceased,” and directed the admiral to “execute an appropriate defensive deployment.” Kimmel also was ordered to “undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.” The communication of the same day to Short declared that “hostile action is possible at any moment” and, like its naval counterpart, urged “measures of reconnaissance.”

    In response to these warnings, the measures taken by the army and navy commanders were, as the event proved, far from adequate. Short ordered an alert against sabotage and concentrated most of his fighter planes at the base on Wheeler Field in an effort to prevent damage to them. He also gave orders to operate five of the mobile radar sets that had been set up in the island from 4:00 am to 7:00 am, considered to be the most dangerous period. (Radar training, however, was in a far-from-advanced stage.)

    Exclusive academic rate for students! Save 67% on Britannica Premium.

    Learn More

    Kimmel, despite the fact that his intelligence had not been able to locate substantial elements in the Japanese fleet—especially the first-line ships in carrier divisions 1 and 2—did not expand his reconnaissance activities to the northwest, the logical point for an attack. He moored the entire fleet (save that part which was at sea) in the harbour and permitted a part of his personnel to go on shore leave. Neither of these officers suspected that the base at Pearl Harbor would itself be subjected to attack. Nor, for that matter, is there any indication that their superiors in Washington were in any way conscious of the approaching danger. In the 10 days between the war warning of November 27 and the Japanese attack itself, no additional action was taken by Washington.

    Early on Sunday morning, December 7, Washington learned that the Japanese ambassadors had been instructed to ask for an interview with the secretary of state at 1:00 pm (7:30 am Pearl Harbor time). This was a clear indication that war was at hand. The message took some time to decode, and it was not in the hands of the chief of naval operations until about 10:30. It was delivered to the War Department between 9:00 and 10:00 am. Gen. George C. Marshall, the U.S. Army chief of staff, was out horseback riding and did not see the dispatch until he arrived at his office about 11:15 am. The chief of naval operations, Adm. Harold Stark, even then did not think that the communication called for any additional instructions to Kimmel. However, Marshall did decide to send a new warning and gave orders to the military command to communicate with the navy. He did not telephone, fearing that his words might be intercepted, and instead sent his dispatch by telegram. There was a mix-up in communication, however, and the warning did not reach Hawaii until after the attack had begun. It is important to note that it had not been filed until noon, only an hour before the Japanese planes moved in on the base.

    • The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica
  6. Of the eight United States Navy battleships present, all were damaged and four were sunk. All but USS Arizona were later raised, and six were returned to service and went on to fight in the war. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers , three destroyers , an anti-aircraft training ship, [ nb 6 ] and one minelayer .

  7. Oct 20, 2016 · During the surprise Japanese attack on December 7, 1941, there were multiple ships sunk at Pearl Harbor. Here are the stories of some of them.

  1. People also search for