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  1. The dictator game is a popular experimental instrument in social psychology and economics, [1] a derivative of the ultimatum game. The term "game" is a misnomer because it captures a decision by a single player: to send money to another or not. [2] Thus, the dictator has the most power and holds the preferred position in this “game.”.

  2. May 18, 2021 · Unfortunately, not all studies using the dictator game have implemented a “no recipient” condition, but it is critical to understanding the underlying motivations of the subjects.

    • Jennifer Vonk
    • vonk@oakland.edu
  3. Jan 1, 2020 · Types of Dictator Games. (a) Non-interactive (two players, one dictator): the dictator's own material payoff depends only on how much he/she keeps, and the recipient's material payoff depends only on how much the dictator gives.

    • Philip D. Grech, Heinrich H. Nax, Heinrich H. Nax
    • 2020
  4. Oct 1, 2010 · Even in a double-blind environment, the Red Cross attracted donations from over 73% of the dictators, as opposed to only 27% in the anonymous recipients condition (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). The average level of contributions was tripled.

    • Francesco Guala, Luigi Mittone
    • 2010
  5. They for instance have played a one-shot game with students, asking dictators to divide a pie of $10 given to them between them-selves and an anonymous recipient from the same subject pool. What looks like a perfectly standard dictator game implicitly provides data on one shot versus repeated games; on games

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    • 45
  6. Jul 23, 2022 · The recipient does nothing during the experiment, and simply accepts the dictator’s decision. If dictators were entirely self-interested, they would give recipients nothing. However, most dictators allocate charitably, even in one-shot, anonymous DGs [6].

  7. Empirical results question the received interpretation of dictator game giving: many fewer agents are willing to transfer money when the action set includes taking. Yet, a result that holds regardless of action set composition is that agents do not ubiquitously choose the most selfish outcome.