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- David Hume postulated that morality may be grounded in senses and emotions rather than reason or divine will, put forth the origins of much of utilitarian thought, and furthered Locke’s empiricism.
digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1013&context=philo
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Oct 29, 2004 · Hume’s position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the “slave of the passions” (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4).
- Property and Ownership
Consequentialist theories, however, may be able to separate...
- Property and Ownership
Situates Hume’s moral theory within the context of his predecessors and successors and provides critical discussion of the main doctrines of Hume’s ethical thought: Hume’s anti-rationalism, sentimentalism, and a detailed discussion and critique of Hume’s artificial-natural virtue distinction.
He says that Hume did not even hope to offer a moral theory, properly speaking, because his intention was merely descriptive: to catalog and file humanity’s moral responses to phenomena.
1. Hume’s Utilitarian Virtue Ethics. Hume comes to morality as a scientist of human nature, aiming to understand its “springs and principles” (E 1.15, 14), but also – inevitably – as himself a human being who partakes of that nature (and who therefore shares many of the attitudes he investigates).
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Oct 25, 2017 · Introduces the relevant elements of Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics and theory of the passions, followed by extensive discussions of Hume’s critique of moral rationalism, his account of the virtues, and his theory of moral judgment.
Ethics. The virtues. Hume takes it to be agreed that moral judgment is primarily a judgment about human character traits, a recognition of ‘virtues’ and ‘vices’ (see Virtues and vices). He has some controversial views both about what enlightened moral judges will and will not include in their lists of virtues, and about how they do their judging.
Nicholas Capaldi (David Hume: The Newtonian Philosopher, Boston, 1975, p. 161) takes the descriptivist position that our moral judgments say what sentiments an informed spectator would have.
