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Sep 24, 2018 · In this paper I argue that two dominant accounts of identification implicated in self-unity (represented respectively by Christine Korsgaard and Harry Frankfurt) fail to acknowledge the significance of a related form of self-unifying activity, self-recognition.
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This chapter begins with a discussion of Dennett's view of self-representation. It introduces the so-called “Joycean Machine”, special narrative module in the brain charged with production of an autobiography. It is argued that the synchronic unity of the thinking subject is the unity of voice and agency wrought by the unifying activity of ...
Issues about knowledge of the self include: (1) how it is that one distinguishes oneself from others, as the object of a self-attribution; (2) whether self-awareness yields a grasp of the material or non-material nature of the self; (3) whether self-awareness yields a grasp of one’s personal identity over time; and (4) what sort of self ...
There are those who argue that it should be understood primarily as a socially constructed “me,” while others claim that the self is a combination of the spontaneous “I” and the “me.” In addition, there are those who emphasize facets of the self that do not fit neatly into either of these two camps.
- Mitchell Aboulafia
- 2016
Jan 1, 2012 · Here, we have the first clear inkling of a multiple self. These different modes of the self, “appear, one after another and side-by-side in the consciousness.” The sense of a unified self is, therefore, “a fabricated illusion.”
- David Lester
- 2012
Learning is a process of knowledge acquisition, where “knowledge” is construed broadly. Next, we delineate five major questions that should govern an area of philosophy properly called “philosophy of learning.” Those questions are: (1) Is learning possible?; (2) Is all knowledge acquired through learning?;
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We classify ourselves biologically as “human beings” and morally and politically as “persons” (bearers of responsibilities and rights), so why do we need still a third concept—“self”—to refer to ourselves? The chapters that follow will present an extensive answer to that question, but the brief answer is evident from Descartes. We think.