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Jul 17, 2018 · ABBYY FineReader 11.0 (Extended OCR) Ppi. 300. Scanner. Internet Archive HTML5 Uploader 1.6.3. 2,238. Uploaded by on. Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.
Epistemic Indolence. Author(s): Richard Foley and Richard Fumerton. Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 91, No. 361 (Jan., 1982), pp. 38-56. Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2253197 Accessed: 03-01-2017 19:48 UTC
Sep 6, 2022 · 1 online resource (xliv, 1161 pages) "This is the leading, full-scale comprehensive dictionary of philosophical terms and thinkers to appear in English in more than half a century.
In this paper I wish to defend the claim that epistemic indolence is epistemically irrational. I will argue that two of the attempts to bar indolence prevail against the authors' objections. I will suggest a more suitable theoretical motivation for the claim than that rejected by the authors. I
- Neutral Opposition
- Do Indolences Exist?
- Are Indolences Sui Generis Algedonic Episodes?
- Are Indolences Really in The Middle of The Algedonic Continuum?
A last kind of opposition, entailedby the concept of polar opposition between properties, is the contrariety between any of the polar opposites and the neutral point lying between them. 1. Neutral opposition:contrariety between polar opposites and the neutral point that separates them. For instance, the good and the bad are each neutrally opposed t...
Are there some mental episodes that are neither pleasant nor unpleasant? This question might sound almost uninteresting nowadays, for its answer appears to be trivially positive. But this has not always been the case. The question was intensively debated at the end of the nineteenth century, and most psychologists and philosophers at that time reje...
One puzzling question is whether indolences consists merely in mental episodes that lack pleasantness and unpleasantness or whether they exemplify some genuine, sui generis property in virtue of which they are indolences? Pleasantness and unpleasantness, the essential properties of pleasures and unpleasures, are standardly though to be sui generis ...
One last and rarely-raised question about indolence is whether it lies in the middle of the algedonic space. Is there, so to speak, more pleasure on its left, more unpleasure on its right, or an equal amount on either side? The pessimist has it that the worst suffering has no counterpart on the hedonic side. The optimist, on the contrary, takes it ...
Semantic Scholar extracted view of "``Epistemic Indolence"" by Richard Foley et al.
In 'Epistemic Indolence' (Mind, XCl (I982), pp. 38-56) we defended the view that a person S rationally believes a proposition p on the basis of his total relevant evidence e if (i) S rationally believes e and (2) S rationally
