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Brenner v. Manson is a landmark Supreme Court case from 1966 that addressed the requirements for patentability, specifically regarding the criteria for determining whether an invention is considered to be 'useful' under patent law. The case highlighted the necessity for a patent applicant to demonstrate practical utility for their invention, impacting how future patents would be evaluated and ...
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that a novel process for making a known steroid did not satisfy the utility requirement, because the patent applicants did not show that the steroid served any practical function. [1] The Court ruled that "a process patent in the ...
May 16, 2024 · A point of law is a theoretical legal concept that refers to the application of principles of law to particular facts. Settling such points is half of the equation in conducting litigation — the other half being settling questions of fact, which is typically the duty of a jury. Generally, any major point of law decided in a case is referred ...
Brenner v. Manson. No. 58. Argued November 17, 1965. Decided March 21, 1966. 383 U.S. 519. Syllabus. In December 1957 Ringold and Rosenkranz applied for a patent on an allegedly novel process for making certain steroids, claiming priority as of December, 1956. A patent issued thereon in 1959.
- Andrei Shleifer
- A Model of Legal Precedent
- Optimal Legal Rules
- W FB p
- Distinguishing
- b ( b
- bO,i /b
- C. Welfare Effects of a Precedent Change
- 2 A ) ]L(A ).
- j ) 1 L(A
- VII. Conclusion
Harvard University We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and i...
There are two parties, a dog owner O and a bite victim V, as well as a dog. The dog bit V, who seeks to recover damages from O. The dog was not on a leash, so to assess O’s liability, one should determine whether O was negligent (and so is liable) or not (and so is not). Let P NP be the probability that the dog bites V if O does not take precaution...
A dog owner finding himself in situation (a, d) decides whether to put the dog on a leash by considering the risk of liability under the prevailing legal rule at (a, d). First-best welfare, achieved under optimal precau-tions (i.e., O puts the dog on a leash whenever a d 1 ), is equal to
DP C, (2) where the probability of a bite when precautions are taken is normalized to zero. In half the cases, precautions are not efficient and the parties bear the extra risk DP of the dog biting the man; in the other half, precautions are efficient and cost C to society. Judge-made law cannot achieve such high welfare because legal rules arrived...
Like social welfare, the utility of a judge settling a dispute between O and V depends on the precision of the rule and on the ratio of different mistakes. We assume that a judge’s objective diverges from efficiency because of his bias, which reflects his preference for V or O and induces him to sacrifice efficiency for a pattern of mistakes more f...
V,j , b V,j O,j 0) capture the pref-erence of judge j for O and V, respectively: the larger b is, the more O,j he is eager to hold O not liable; the larger b V,j is, the more he is willing to hold O liable. Under the assumed utility function, judges are unhappy with any error they make (albeit differentially for different errors). This judicial ave...
V,i measures the pro-O bias of this judge. Judge i then sets bi p . bi (7) The subscript indicates that A is the initial precedent set with pro-O bias bi. The result is intuitive: the more pro-O the judge is, the more lenient he is (the higher A i is). The precedent Ai coincides with the efficient one-dimensional rule A L only if b p under l p Love...
After judge j distinguishes the initial precedent A , social losses i are
i j (14) The term L(A ) stands for the social loss under the hypothetical as-sumption that the initial rule is chosen by judge j and captures the idea that legal change allows judges to regain their discretion. The term 2 A ) captures the precision benefit of distinguishing. If i the initial threshold A were not binding in virtue of stare decisis, ...
) ), legal change reduces welfare when the precision benefit of distinguishing is small. To illustrate, consider the extreme case in which judge i is infinitely pro-V and judge j is infinitely pro-O. The precision benefit of distinguishing is now absent, and legal change ef-fectively allows the second judge to replace the initial rule of strict lia...
When and how does the evolution of judge-made law take place? When does such evolution improve the law on average? Does it lead to con-vergence to efficient legal rules? We addressed these questions in a legal-realist model in which deciding judges face opportunities to distinguish the precedent from the case before them, but may be both biased and...
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Facts. Manson (Plaintiff) sought to patent a chemical process for synthesizing certain steroidal compounds. Although these compounds were not in themselves beneficial, they were useful in cancer research. The Patent Office (Defendant) denied the application on the basis that the process was not useful. The Court of Customs and Patent ...
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May 25, 2023 · May 25, 2023 by Avery Devereaux. The fascinating journey of law’s evolution is intricately intertwined with historical events that have left an indelible mark on legal principles and practices. Throughout the ages, significant milestones have shaped legal systems, molding them into what we know today. Let’s embark on a captivating ...
