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Nov 1, 2000 · This paper explores, both formally and empirically, the political accountability mechanisms that lie behind the varying levels of public corruption and of effective governance taking place across nations.
- Alícia Adserà, Alícia Adserà, Alícia Adserà, Carles Boix, Mark Payne
- 2000
As formally proved in Appendix A, in a principal-agent model that extends Persson and Tabellini's (2000) setup, the effectiveness of any control mechanisms varies with the type of political regime, the level of information among the public, and the type of assets that prevail in the economy.
Oct 1, 2003 · How well any government functions hinges on how good citizens are at making their politicians accountable for their actions. Political control of public officials depends on two factors. First, free and regular elections allow citizens to discipline politicians—the credible threat of losing office in the next period compels policy makers to ...
- Alícia Adserà, Carles Boix, Mark Payne
- 2003
Being dependent on electors’ support, politicians would strive to deliver good services and refrain from extracting rents. Yet that solution may be only partial.
Dec 1, 2000 · The first section develops a principal-agent model in which good governance is a function of the extent to which citizens can hold political officials accountable for their actions.
Introduction. Although the number of democratic regimes and thus the use of proper. constitutional mechanisms to make politicians accountable to citizens. have expanded substantially in the last decades, corruption among public officials and, more generally, malfunctioning governments remain wide- spread phenomena across the globe.
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The first section develops a principal-agent model in which good governance is a function of the extent to which citizens can hold political officials accountable for their actions.
