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‘Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self’ is an outcome of the project ‘Virtues Old and New: Virtue Ethics in Hume and Mandeville’ (Czech Science Foundation).
HUME'S BUNDLE THEORY OF THE SELF: A LIMITED DEFENSE. THE secondary literature two major on. Human Nature contains criticisms of the bundle theory of the self. The first centers on. the problem of specifying a criterion by which. perceptions can be grouped together into individual bundles.
Hume’s account of the idea of self is highly distinctive but not fully elaborated. The first section of this chapter describes some of the most important roles that the idea of self plays in Hume’s Treatise, and it highlights three questions that naturally arise from this description.
The Appendix, rather, is designed to clarify and strengthen Hume’s scepticism: after publishing the Treatise Hume realises that there is not only no introspectable evidence for realist accounts of personal identity, but that such accounts are self-contradictory.
Jul 1, 2014 · This chapter aims to relate Hume’s discussion of liberty and necessity to central themes in his philosophy, including causation, the self, the distinction between virtue and vice, and naturalism as a response to skepticism.
HUME AND THE SELF AT A MOMENT Cindy D. Stern HUME'S discussion of personal identity is concerned with the problem of identity over time. It is thus fitting that the vast body of literature addressing Hume's discussion focuses on this issue. However, Hume's account of the identity of a person over a stretch of time has consequences
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HUME ON IDENTITY: A DEFENSE (Received 12 December, 1980) In his classic article Hume on Personal Identity, Terence Penelhum charges that Hume, in maintaining that we are always mistaken in ascribing identity to persons, has made "an elementary error" and fallen victim to a conceptual "'muddle".'