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1. plato.stanford.edu › entries › substanceSubstance - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

   plato.stanford.edu › entries › substance

   Oct 3, 2004 · The idea of substance has its first theoretical articulation in Aristotle’s Categories, where he distinguishes between individual substances, such as a man or a horse, and the various kinds of properties they can possess, such as being five foot, white, lying down, or in the Lyceum (1b25–2a4).

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2. www.cambridge.org › core › booksForm, Substantial - The Cambridge Descartes Lexicon

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   Jan 5, 2016 · The form constitutes the nature or essence of the substance, and it explains why humans laugh, horses neigh, and water cools down when removed from a source of heat (Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, XV.1). Substantial forms must be distinguished from real qualities, which are accidents.

3. gmgauthier.com › post › aristotle-101-substance-inAristotle 101: Substance in the Categories · Greg Gauthier

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   Mar 15, 2020 · This essay will summarise Aristotle’s conception of substance as he presents it in The Categories, briefly explain what distinguishes substance from the other categories, and offer some additional thoughts about the metaphysics of being, in relation to Aristotle’s mentor, Plato.

4. iep.utm.edu › substanceSubstance - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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   In its first sense, “substance” refers to those things that are object-like, rather that property-like. For example, an elephant is a substance in this sense, whereas the height or colour of the elephant is not. In its second sense, “substance” refers to the fundamental building blocks of reality.

5. human.libretexts.org › Bookshelves › Philosophy4: Substance Dualism in Descartes - Humanities LibreTexts

   human.libretexts.org › Bookshelves › Philosophy

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   The essence of things (whether an artifact like a ship or the souls of plants, animals, and humans) was termed the thing’s “substantial form.” Forms make and express the substance of things. The thing’s substantial form makes a thing what it is, and makes it possible to conceive of it and to know it.

6. philosophy-models.blog › 2020/09/10 › st-thomas[4.9.1] St Thomas Aquinas on Substance and Change

   philosophy-models.blog › 2020/09/10 › st-thomas

   Sep 10, 2020 · Incidental (or accidental) changes modify the substance’s incidental forms (or properties) like quality, quantity, place, while substantial change modifies its existence. The following OntoUML diagram presents Aquinas’s model of substance and change:

7. People also ask

   Why does Aristotle call a substance a substantial form?

   • One explanation for Aristotle’s claim in the Metaphysics that it is the substantial form that most merits the title of “substance” concerns material change. In the Categories, Aristotle emphasises that substances are distinguished by their ability to survive through change.

   Substance - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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   Which substance has only one substantial form according to Aquinas?

   • According to Aquinas, a substance has only one substantial form. For example, the substantial form of an elephant is the species elephant. The parts of the elephant, such as its organs, do not have their own substantial forms.

   Substance - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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   Can a substantial change be a substance?

   • The subject of a substantial change cannot be a substance; if it were, the result would be a modification of that substance, that is, an incidental change. But we are trying to understand how a substance itself comes into being as the result of a change. There must be a matter or subject but it cannot be matter in the sense of a substance.

   [4.9.1] St Thomas Aquinas on Substance and Change

   philosophy-models.blog/2020/09/10/st-thomas-aquinas-on-substance-change/

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   What is the difference between accidental change and substantial change?

   • Incidental (or accidental) changes modify the substance’s incidental forms (or properties) like quality, quantity, place, while substantial change modifies its existence. The following OntoUML diagram presents Aquinas’s model of substance and change: According to Aquinas substances are what are primarily said to exist.

   [4.9.1] St Thomas Aquinas on Substance and Change

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   What is Aristotle's distinction between substances and non-substances?

   • In this respect, Aristotle’s distinction between substances and non-substances approximates the everyday distinction between objects and properties. Scholars tend to agree that Aristotle treats the things that are said of a subject as universals and other things as particulars.

   Substance - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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   What is Aristotle's primary substance?

   • As a result, Aristotle argues that primary substance is SUBSTANTIAL FORM, i.e., the form (or essence, or nature) of particular substances such as Socrates. That is to say, in the composite of matter and form which constitutes Socrates, it is the formal component which is the primary substance. This formal component is his essence.

   Aristotle on Primary Substance - MIT OpenCourseWare

   ocw.mit.edu/courses/24-200-ancient-philosophy-fall-2004/966b9b904ae6ae40dca146c2cf310cbe_asubsthdo.pdf

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8. ocw.mit.edu › courses › 24-200-ancient-philosophyAristotle on Primary Substance - MIT OpenCourseWare

   ocw.mit.edu › courses › 24-200-ancient-philosophy

   individual substance such as Socrates will be generated just in case the "form" of the new composite is a substantial form, e.g., the essence or nature of human being (which is human soul). An individual substance will be destroyed just in case the "lack" which is lost is a substantial form.